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Abstract
There is growing recognition that coastal water quality is interdependent with agricultural management in
coastal catchments. Economic incentive-based instruments can be used to internalize the negative
externalities from coastal water pollution. In this paper we assess a performance-based instrument for
promoting the adoption of management practices for water quality improvement in heterogeneous sugarcane
farming communities in the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) region, with emphasis on regional income and dissolved
inorganic nitrogen (DIN) delivery impacts. We combine financial and environmental analyses of farming
systems at the paddock scale with a mathematical modelling approach at the farm scale, differentiating for
three farm typologies, aggregated to the catchment scale. Management practice adoption rates are assessed
by exploring how different types of farmers are likely to respond to economic incentive-based instruments,
using a nutrient accounting system to institute both levies and bonuses that, respectively, penalise pollution
and provide incentives for reducing DIN export.
Keywords
Adoption; land use; land management; water quality improvement; heterogeneity; farming community; natural
resource policy; Great Barrier Reef
1
INTRODUCTION
Coastal and marine ecosystems around the world are threatened by disturbances (e.g. climate change and
water pollution) caused by human activity (Brodie et al., 2012; Burke et al., 2011). Estuarine and coastal water
quality is adversely impacted by extensive eutrophication caused by the agricultural sector (Canfield et al.,
2010; Smith and Schindler, 2009). For example, (nonpoint source) pollution from agricultural activity is linked
to the degradation of coastal ecosystems in the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), Australia (Kroon 2011; Kroon et al.,
2011). Population growth, climate change and the intensification of industrial and agricultural activity are likely
to increase eutrophication of estuarine and coastal waters (Rabalais et al., 2009). To address this issue,
improved management of resources in coastal catchments is needed (Doney, 2010; Smith and Schindler,
2009).
In this study we explore the implications of landholder heterogeneity based on a specified landholder
classification, i.e. farm enterprise typology, by accounting for differences in property size, labour availability,
learning costs and transition costs, to explore the potential consequences of economic incentive-based
instruments for water quality improvement. We model how different types of farmers respond to an economic
incentives-based approach where pollution beyond a specified level is taxed, whereas improvement beyond
this level is subsidised. This conceptual approach provides information regarding the cost-effectiveness of the
instrument, but also on likely socio-economic indicators, such as farm enterprise typology specific adoption
rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows; in the next section we provide background information for
the research presented in this paper. In the following section we describe the methods used in this research
followed by a section where we describe the modelling framework used to investigate the problem. We then
present the results in a final section, followed by a discussion and conclusion.
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2
BACKGROUND
The World Heritage listed Great barrier Reef (GBR), adjacent to the Queensland coast in Australia, is the
largest reef system in the world with over 3,000 reefs covering an area of approximately 350,000 square
kilometres, (Haynes and Michalek-Wagner, 2000). Degradation of GBR ecosystems has been linked with
increases in land-based pollutant runoff since European settlement (Kroon et al. 2011). Pollutant sources have
been identified and include suspended sediment from erosion in cattle grazing areas; nitrate from fertiliser
application on crop lands; and herbicides from various land uses (Brodie et al. 2012). Sugarcane dominates
agricultural production in the high risk GBR catchment of the Tully-Murray (Armour et al. 2009; Kroon 2009).
2.1 Nitrogen losses from sugarcane cultivation
The majority of sugarcane grown in GBR catchments is located on floodplains, close to the end of catchments.
This proximity to the end of catchments means water draining from sugarcane farms can reach the GBR
lagoon quickly, leaving little opportunity for in-river processes to remove pollutants from the flow (Furnas and
Mitchell, 2001). N losses in water from sugarcane production occur through two pathways, leaching via deep
drainage below the root zone, or in surface runoff. Webster et al. (2011) reported N losses to both surface
water and via deep drainage are reduced when lower nitrogen application rates are applied. They propose that
nitrogen rate is the most important determinant of N losses, being more important than other management
practices such as surface versus sub-surface fertiliser application.
For the load estimations of N at the end of catchments (Kroon et al. 2011) to be achieved, Webster et al.
(2011) hypothesis that greater than 60% of the N lost through deep drainage is reaching surface water via
lateral flow, supporting the work of Rasiah et al. (2005) that N losses via deep drainage are the most important
to manage to reduce anthropogenic N contributions to the Great Barrier Reef.
2.2 Government intervention
In 2003, the Queensland state and the Australian Governments jointly launched a voluntary policy instrument,
a 10-year commitment to address diffuse source pollution from agriculture to halt and reverse the decline in
water quality entering the GBR, named the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan (Reef Plan; RWQPP 2003). In
2008, the Reef Plan was reviewed, and updated in 2009 (Reef Water Quality Protection Plan Secretariat,
2009; RWQPP 2009). In addition, in 2008, the Federal Government announced its Reef Rescue Program,
including the Water Quality Grants Scheme ($146 million over 5 years) that provides land managers with
matching funding to implement land management activities that will improve water quality run-off from
properties. Furthermore, on January 2010 the Queensland Government introduced the Great Barrier Reef
Protection Amendment Act 2009 (GBRPAA 2009) to regulate a number of specified activities on cattle grazing
and sugar cane properties in catchments in the Wet Tropics, Burdekin and Mackay–Whitsunday regions.
3
METHODS
In this paper we use a bio-economic approach that explores the cost-effectiveness of improving catchment
water quality via the adoption of prioritized land management practice changes in a heterogeneous farming
community. We model how different types of farmers respond to an economic incentives-based approach
where pollution beyond a specified level is taxed, whereas improvement beyond this level is subsidised.
Adoption rates are estimated by predicting how different farm types are likely to respond to different levels of
the levy/bonus system. In addition, farm level profit and environmental consequences of implementing this
system are modelled.
3.1 Farm enterprise typology
The research presented in this paper concentrates on the sugarcane growing sector in the Tully-Murray
catchment. To develop a classification of sugarcane farmers in the Tully -Murray catchment, qualitative
interviews with the widest possible range of sugarcane farmers and land managers were carried out during
2006. The resultant landholder profile comprised three types of sugarcane farming agents, broadly based on
farm size (Bohnet, 2008).
In the Tully-Murray case study area, the landholder profile is matched with geographical information, through
intersection of farm property information from the Digital Cadastral Data Base (DCDB) of Queensland (2006),
land use from Queensland Land Use Mapping Program (QLUMP 2004) and soil type data layers (from
Roebeling et al. 2009), using the geographical information system software ArcGIS by ESRI. This allows for
the identification and characterisation of agents according to their specific objectives, their agricultural
production system and socio-economic features and their spatially explicit agro-ecological conditions (e.g. soil
typology).
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3.2 Management practices for water quality improvement
A range of agricultural management practices have been developed to address water pollutant exports from
sugarcane farms while maintaining production (Roebeling et al. 2009; Schroeder et al. 2009; Thorburn et al.
2010). The management practices we use in this research have been adopted from the ‘ABCD’ framework of
farming system classification used by natural resource management (NRM) regions for Reef Rescue (Higham
et al. 2008). The ‘ABCD’ framework describes management practices that range from degrading (D), common
(C), and best or industry recommended (B), through to aspirational, cutting edge (A) farming systems that
would provide the greatest water quality improvement.
3.3 Transition costs
Information on required capital investments and changes in farm gross margins has been adopted from
financial economic research in various GBR catchments by Van Grieken et al. (2010). To account for variation
in farm sizes while faced with investments, the investment quantities provided by Van Grieken et al. (2010) are
adjusted. This analysis uses a 6 year investment horizon, representing the full crop cycle of the sugarcane
planting in the Wet Tropics. Hence the future revenues are discounted at a 7% real rate to represent these
cash flows in present values (Zerbe and Dively 1994).
Each farm type has a specific per hectare requirement for labour. In this analysis we assume economies of
scale for labour requirements. Furthermore, management practices for water quality improvement tend to
require less operational hours. Counterbalancing the labour savings are the transition costs (e.g. time spent on
learning about a new practice).
Expert consultation suggests that farmers face once-off as well as re-occurring time investments when faced
with changing land management practices. Examples given for once-off time investments are the time spent
purchasing new equipment, the time learning to operate new equipment and the time learning about new
management practices. Examples for re-occurring time investments are the time spent on record keeping.
These transition costs are used to estimate changes in labour requirements when changes in land
management take place. In line with Pannell and Wilkinson (2009) we found that small and medium sugarcane
farmers experience higher transition costs then the large sugarcane farmers.
3.4 Production system simulation
Sugarcane input-output data for different management practices were generated using the APSIM (version
7.0) cropping systems model (Keating et al. 2003). The APSIM model was used because it is capable of
modelling N cycling in sugarcane production systems (e.g. Thorburn et al. 2011), and has been used
previously in bio-economic modelling in the Tully region (Roebeling et al. 2009; Van Grieken et al. 2011).
APSIM was used to predict regional soil type specific productivity (sugarcane yield) and environmental
indicators (available DIN; Van Grieken et al. 2011).
3.5 Paddock to end of river delivery of pollutants
The APSIM cropping system simulator provides plot scale DIN in runoff and DIN leached below the root zone
for each scenario. In our framework we assume 100% of DIN in runoff reaches the GBR lagoon (Furnas and
Mitchell 2001) and 60% of N in deep drainage reaches the GBR lagoon (Webster et al. 2011).
3.6 Nutrient accounting system
In this paper we assess the cost-effectiveness of an economic incentive-based policy instrument in promoting
the adoption of best management practices to achieve DIN water quality improvement. When landholders
pollute beyond a specified performance standard level of DIN exported from the farm (runoff and deep
drainage leaching), a tax is charged for each corresponding kg of DIN. However if landholders adopt
management that reduces pollution beyond this baseline level, a subsidy will be granted for each
corresponding kg of DIN. This may also occur if landholders decide to take their land out of production.
This conceptual approach is based on the Mineral Accounting System (MINAS) introduced in 1998 by the
Dutch Government, to reduce farm gate nutrient surpluses. MINAS is a nutrient bookkeeping system in which
nitrogen and phosphate outputs are subtracted from the inputs. The resulting surpluses are taxed if they
exceed a predetermined surplus standard (Ondersteijn et al. 2003). We extend on this approach by, in addition
to taxing surpluses; exploring the provision of incentive subsidies for negative surpluses (i.e. outputs are lower
than the predetermined standard).
4
FRAMEWORK
To estimate the level of adoption of farming systems by farmers in the Tully-Murray catchment under the levybonus system, we use a linear constrained optimisation model. It assesses how different types of sugarcane
producers in the Tully-Murray catchment are likely to respond to changes in their decision environment. The
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model uses production functions to explore the farmers’ decision making process. The farm enterprise will try
to maximize their (gross) income, which is defined as the gross value from sugarcane production and on- and
off-farm employment, minus the costs related to the use of labour and agricultural inputs, and corrected for
private costs and or benefits from policy interventions. The most important constraints faced by each producer
or farm type are related to the use of production systems, land, labour and agricultural output. As we estimate
short term responses to instruments (1 full crop cycle; 6 years), land use is constrained to the currently
available agricultural area. Available farm household labour can be used for on- and off-farm employment,
where each farm profile has a specified proportion of off-farm employment. Also, labour can be hired-in for onfarm agricultural production.
For the Tully-Murray case study, the model estimates production, income, resource use and employment at
the farm and regional level for identified sugarcane farms in the study area. The mathematical optimisation
model is solved using GAMS 22.7 (Brooke et al. 1998).
5
RESULTS
In this section, the results are presented. After presenting the base scenario, against which all scenario results
are compared, details will be provided with regards to the regional as well as farm type specific net abatement
costs, the changes of area under land use and land management, and regional productivity.
5.1 Base scenario
To determine the base scenario, an initial or pre-base model run was performed where all farms in the region
start off operating under C Class management. After this initial run, accounting for farm type specific
characteristics such as farm size, gross margins per hectare, investment costs and labour availability, the
results determine the base distribution of management across the landscape. The base distribution of
management Classes is presented in Table 1. These result have been validated with local experts to ensure a
realistic distribution is presented.
5.2 Abatement costs
Net (private costs/benefits net of public earnings/spendings) abatement costs are calculated for all farm types,
and aggregated to the region. The abatement achieved is presented for a levy/bonus of up to $40 per kg of
DIN polluted/abated by farms. For large farm, at a levy/bonus level of $40, the maximum abatement achieved
is likely to be just under 15%. This would results to a net cost to the region of just over $9M over the whole
crop cycle. For the medium sized farms, the abatement at this levy/bonus level would be just over 19%. The
net cost to the region equals just over $10M. At the highest levy/bonus level the potential for abatement for
small farms is just under 43%, with associated net costs of just over $24M. For the whole region, this equates
to a potential decrease in DIN exports of almost 77%, at a net cost to the region of just under $44M over the
whole crop cycle.
Cost-efficiency of the mineral accounting system for water quality improvement is presented in Table 1. For
example, at a levy/bonus of $8 per kg DIN polluted/abated, the total reduction in DIN delivery that can be
achieved is 19% compared to the base scenario. The cost-efficiency at this level of levy/bonus is $4.58. In
other words, the net cost to the region of a levy/bonus of $8/kg DIN polluted/abated is just under $5 per kg
reduction of DIN exported. At a levy/bonus of $40 per kg DIN polluted/abated, the total reduction in DIN
delivery that can be achieved is 77% compared to the base scenario. The cost-efficiency at this level of
levy/bonus is $19.82.
5.3 Land use and management distribution
Table 1 furthermore shows the distribution of land use and management for increasing levy-bonus values from
AU$0 (base scenario) to AU$40, in steps of AU$8. In the base scenario, 44% of the land under sugarcane is
cultivated using B class management. C Class management is represented by 42% of the sugarcane land,
with sugarcane land cultivated using A Class management only at 14%. With increased levy/bonus levels,
management practices shift from C and B Class dominated, to A Class dominated. At a levy/bonus of $8/kg
DIN polluted/abated beyond the standard, A Class management is now adopted on 41% of the sugarcane
land; however the majority of sugarcane land is still cultivated using B- and C Class management (59%). At
the highest levy/bonus level ($40/kg DIN), almost all sugarcane land is cultivated using A Class management
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(97%), where only very little of the land is under C Class management (3%). This is made up by landholders
with very small land, where initial investments to change to B- and A Class management is not offset by the
increased per hectare gross margins.
Scenario
Base

Cost-efficiency
($/kg)
-

DIN delivery
(% reduction)
-

Management
Class A (%)
14%

Management
Class B (%)
44%

Management
Class C (%)
42%

Levy $8

$4.58

19%

41%

23%

36%

Levy $16

$9.14

38%

67%

7%

26%

Levy $24

$13.57

57%

86%

3%

11%

Levy $32

$15.75

66%

94%

1%

5%

Levy $40

$19.82

77%

97%

0%

3%

Table 1 Cost-efficiency of a mineral accounting system; Management class distribution as a percentage of
total land under sugarcane cultivation
The area of land use and specific management for each farm type is calculated separately, as well as
aggregated to the region (see Figure 1). With a levy/bonus of $12 all the sugarcane land operated by large
farms is operated using A Class management. At a levy/bonus level of $4 the medium sized farms start
adopting A Class management, and at a level of $24 all the land is operated using A Class management. At a
levy/bonus level of $4, landholders owning small farms start adopting B Class management, and at the level of
$12, they commence the adoption of A Class management. At the highest level of levy/bonus ($40) the
majority of sugarcane land is managed using A Class practices. A few farms remain under C Class
management, and many farms take land out of production.
Figure 1 shows how land use and management as well as sugarcane production changes in the catchment
with increased levy/bonus levels. From the first levy/bonus level ($4), limited sugarcane land is taken out of
production (4%; Farm type 3). At the highest levy/bonus level, 39% of sugarcane land is taken out of
production. With decreased land under cultivation, regional productivity drops in the region. At $40/kg
polluted/abated, regional productivity drops with more than 41%.

Figure 1 Total regional area under cane production and management with increasing levy-bonus values (Xaxis), including regional cane productivity. The left Y-axis represents area (ha) whereas the right Y-axis
regional productivity (t/yr)
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we presented a bio-economic approach that explores the cost-effectiveness of improving
catchment water quality via the adoption of prioritized land management practice changes in a heterogeneous
farming community. We modelled how different types of farmers respond to an economic incentives-based
approach where pollution beyond a predetermined surplus standard is taxed, whereas improvement beyond
this level is subsidised. Adoption rates were estimated by predicting how different farm types are likely to
respond to different levels of the levy/bonus system. Furthermore, regional socio-economic and environmental
consequences of implementing the policy were estimated, such as changes in local income, employment and
nitrogen run-off.
Net abatement costs are calculated for all farm types, and aggregated to the region. In the base scenario, the
large commercial farms (farm type 1), are already largely operating in management Class B and A. This
means their margin for improvement (reducing DIN exports) by changing management is small (given current
available technology) in comparison with farm type 2 and farm type 3. The small farms (farm type 3) on the
contrary, are largely still operating under management C, leaving substantial margin for water quality
improvement by changing management to Class A and B.
With regards to land use and management distribution, in the base scenario, C and B Class management
dominate in the region, with some sugarcane land cultivated using A Class management. With increased
levy/bonus levels, management practices shift from C and B Class dominated, to A Class dominated. At the
highest levy/bonus level almost all sugarcane land is cultivated using A Class management. More specifically,
large farms initially operate in a mix of B and A Class management and shift rapidly to A Class management.
With a levy/bonus of $12 all the sugarcane land operated by large farms is operated using A Class
management. The medium sized farms operate in B Class management and slowly change towards A Class
management. At a level of $24 all the land is operated using A Class management. Small farms operate
mainly in C Class management, shift to combined A and B Class management, before shifting to mainly A
Class management. At a levy/bonus level of $40 the majority of sugarcane land is managed using A Class
practices. A few farms remain under C Class management, and many farms take land out of production.
At the highest levy/bonus level, 39% of sugarcane land is taken out of production. Intuitively, with decreased
land under cultivation, sugarcane production drops in the region. At $40/kg polluted/abated, regional
productivity drops with more than 41%. This raises additional questions not addressed in this research, such
as the viability of regional sugarcane mills (see for example Van Grieken et al. 2011).
A number of biophysical and cost related caveats of this study must be mentioned. First, industry water
pollution abatement costs are based on the management practices assessed and, thus, do not include any
alternative technologies, some of which are currently under development, that may prove cost effective in the
future. Second, related to the previous point, industry water pollution abatement costs are based on current
land-use patterns and, consequently, gains from land-use change between industries are not taken into
account. Third, equivalent production functions are used for all farm types, but this could potentially differ and
needs to be investigated further. Small farmers may not be as productive per hectare as their bigger
colleagues or they may face differing cost functions or production constraints that we did not explore in this
paper. Fourth, in this study it is assumed that labour is freely available for hire – which is not always the case in
small towns or during peak labour periods. Fifth, instrument transaction costs are not included in the analyses
which could have implications on cost-effectiveness, especially on the adoption and delivery process. Pannell
and Wilkinson (2009) for example, found that transaction costs are likely to be higher for small scale (lifestyle)
farmers than for larger scale (commercial) farmers. Sixth, it is important to note that a nutrient accounting
system as explored in this study may prove difficult in practice as it relies on adequate and proven modelling. It
is both difficult and costly to monitor nonpoint emissions with current technology because their diffuse nature.
Furthermore, they are impacted by random events such as weather and depend on many site specific factors
(Ribaudo 1999). Last, the approach used here is deterministic and is, as a result, does not account for
uncertainty. Consequently and self-evidently, care should be taken when using the figures presented in this
study for policy and planning purposes.
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